Security remains a critical issue in contemporary international relations. From the genocide in Palestine to the recent U.S.-Iran War, interstate relations remain deeply entangled with conflict and warfare, notwithstanding the establishment of robust economic interdependence. More importantly, the concept of security has evolved to encompass food, health, and cyber security, thereby positioning security considerations as increasingly central to both state and societal life. In response to these dynamics, the Chinese government launched the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022, asserting that ‘security of one country should not come at the expense of that of others, and security of a region cannot be ensured by strengthening or even expanding military blocs’ (FMPRC 2022). Beijing argues that the expansion of military alliances and the perpetuation of a ‘Cold War mentality’ undermine international stability (China Diplomacy, n.d.). Consequently, international relations scholars view GSI as Beijing’s attempt to promote an alternative approach to addressing and resolving global security issues (Dian and Menegazzi 2025; Tudoroiu 2025).
Furthermore, GSI does not merely highlight geopolitical rivalry rather the framework also identifies food crises, climate change, cyberattacks, and cross-border diseases such as COVID-19 as significant security threats (CPPCC 2022; FMPRC 2022). China frames security as a shared responsibility rather than an arena for competition. Accordingly, achieving collective security requires a multilateral cooperation framework that rests on six interlinked and mutually reinforcing principles covering non-interference, respecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity, complying with the UN Charter, indivisible security, and peaceful settlement (China Diplomacy, n.d.). More importantly, in his speech, Xi Jinping highlighted the vital importance of the Asian region as a cornerstone of global prosperity, thereby necessitating concerted efforts to maintain security and cooperation among Asian nations, not to mention his strong emphasis on ASEAN Centrality as an essential foundation for Asian regional governance (CPPCC 2022).
The establishment of GSI serves as a sequel that complements a series of previous Chinese initiatives, namely the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative. While the core principles of GSI still encompass China’s longstanding foreign policy commitments, GSI Concept Paper reflects that Beijing’s agenda has moved from spreading normative rhetoric to offering a functional framework for security cooperation, focusing on tangible capacity-building, international policing, and non-traditional security governance. Consequently, this paper argues that GSI has the potential to emerge as a new security regime, particularly for Global South nations, to counter the Quad and AUKUS. A regime itself is understood as a set of mutual principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures agreed upon by states to govern a specific area on the international stage (Krasner 1982). Nonetheless, the lingering question remains as to how China promotes GSI to become such a regime. Therefore, to elaborate on this context, this study utilizes the conceptual framework of regime formation.
Regime Formation
The dynamics of international regimes, ranging from their formation and transformation to their eventual collapse, have long been a pivotal area of study within international relations. On one hand, according to Krasner (1982) regimes function as intervening variables capable of shaping state attitudes and behaviours, irrespective of their underlying interests. Increasingly complex global challenges, characterized by a growing multiplicity of actors, interconnected issues, and far-reaching impacts, demand regimes that can effectively deliver solutions, much like those found in trade and environmental preservation. For states, on the other hand, regimes allow them to reach ‘pareto-optimal outcomes’ or results that are mutually beneficial yet would be difficult to achieve unilaterally without high-level coordination among states (Krasner 1982).
In a similar fashion, Keohane (1984) notes that state behaviour is profoundly influenced by the opportunities and constraints present in the international arena. Keohane further stresses that the primary function of international regimes is to overcome failures in interstate cooperation, which are frequently caused by prohibitive negotiation costs and the absence of clear rules or sanctions for non-compliance. Accordingly, regimes are seen as viable vehicles that enable states to reduce negotiation costs and foster mutual confidence and mutual expectations, thereby ultimately facilitating the formation of cooperation.
In the context of regime formation, traditional theories often attribute regime formation either to the presence of a global superpower as the hegemon actor (Gilpin 1988) or the simple calculation of joint gains by rational actors (Keohane 1984; Krasner 1982). Young (1982), alternatively, argues that regime formation can be induced when a state exercises entrepreneurial leadership to invent a new framework and persuade others to support it. This capacity is deployed to solve collective problems and exogenous shocks by prioritizing structural equity among states, effectively generating a strategic feeling of uncertainty that incentivizes states to abandon zero-sum competition and cooperate. Further, from this perspective, the success of regime formation hinges on institutional bargaining that grants states an equal footing to negotiate, rather than on hegemonic power.
GSI as a Potential Regime
To date, GSI has been implemented across various facets of China’s foreign policy. Southeast Asia, particularly the Mekong Subregion, has served as a pilot zone for this framework. Through the LMC, China drove the adoption of the Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation 2023–2027 in 2024, which strengthens law enforcement and security cooperation among Mekong basin countries (Freeman et al. 2024; LMC 2024). In the previous year, Beijing also established a special joint operation with Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos to tackle gambling and fraud activities in the region (Freeman et al. 2024). However, it is noteworthy that while GSI is easily well-received in Southeast Asia due to its alignment with ASEAN Centrality, the initiative still garners mixed responses from Southeast Asian nations. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar have been the most receptive to GSI, while the Vietnamese government has been particularly guarded due to its emphasis on indivisible security, a concept used by Russia to justify its invasion of Ukraine (Yuliantoro 2024; Nedić 2023).
Beijing has also extended the influence of GSI to other distant regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and to some extent, the European continent through the 12-Point China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis issued in 2023 (FMPRC 2023). Its most strategic implementation perhaps occurred during the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, in which China played a significant role as the mediator by applying GSI principles to regional hotspots (Mitic 2023; Global Times 2023). In 2024, the Chinese government invited representatives from 14 Palestinian factions to Beijing, culminating in the signing of the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity (Xiaolin 2024; Global Times 2024). Indeed, these activities reflect China’s efforts to provide alternative conflict resolution mechanisms that differ substantially from Western approaches. For instance, rather than deploying sanction mechanisms, the Chinese government chose to prioritize the principle of indivisible security in resolving the Ukraine crisis, while the Beijing Declaration inclusively encompassed all Palestinian factions instead of just Fatah and Hamas.
When analysed through the framework of regime formation, these manoeuvres illustrate China’s ambition to become an entrepreneurial leader that relies not only on its status as a major power but also on ideational aspects to influence global security dynamics. As GSI puts a heavy emphasis on the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference, it becomes an egalitarian framework that redirects the international system back toward the spirit of the Westphalian treaty. More importantly, GSI provides an inclusive space for all nations regardless of their underlying ideologies, as stated in GSI Concept Paper that every country’s ‘right to independently choose social systems and development paths must be upheld’ (China Diplomacy, n.d.). Accordingly, the various principles embedded within GSI can lead to conditions of uncertainty that incentivize states to forge security cooperation in order to achieve indivisible security instead of falling into a security dilemma.
However, GSI remains far from becoming a fully established international security regime. China’s contributions to conflict resolution since the inception of GSI have remained largely ad hoc and crisis-specific, rather than providing a set of enduring rules that can be applied across various security issues over the long term. GSI also currently lacks clear-cut and effective compliance mechanisms that are easy to verify, as the implementation of this initiative continues to be predicated on mutual confidence and shared interests. Simultaneously, although GSI endorses the principles of equality and justice for all nations, China, as the initiator of GSI, still dominates the implementation of this framework through bilateral and multilateral cooperation with its counterparts.
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