On November 5, 2024, the United States held another presidential election in which Donald Trump managed to secure the position of number one person in the United States. Not much different from his first term as president, Trump continues to glorify protectionist foreign policies to make America great again. Stronger border for immigrants, scathing rebuke of NATO, and higher trade tariff with certain countries are becoming his top agenda. Therefore, it is imperative to pay attention to how Trump’s second victory can affect the global situation, especially the Asia-Pacific region, which is currently in the spotlight given the potential for a military conflict such as that between China and Taiwan. Meanwhile, Trump’s victory is also closely watched by Asian-Pacific leaders, including China and Taiwan, who have experienced turbulence in their relations with the United States during the first Trump years.
TRUMP’S CHINA AND TAIWAN FOREIGN POLICY FLASHBACK
Since 1979, when the United States shifted its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, it has developed a stable relationship with both Chinese nation-states. For Taiwan, in fact, the United States is its closest ally that Taiwanese society and leaders believe will assist The Island to resist Chinese military incursion (Wu & Lin, 2022). Nevertheless, under the first Trumpian administration, Washington has taken a different approach to dealing with Beijing and Taipei, including addressing the longstanding conflict between the two. Since the beginning of his candidacy, Trump accused China of being ‘a currency manipulator,’ as the United States often run a trade deficit with China, and pledged to address this issue once he was elected as president.
Graph 1. U.S. Trade with China
Source: (Buchholz, 2019)
Making good on his campaign promise, Trump initiated the establishment of trade tariffs against China’s goods starting in 2018, and was responded to by China with a tit-for-tat strategy that eventually led to a trade war between the two global economic giants. Despite the consequences – it was reported by UN economists that the trade war has hurt the countries involved and the global economy – the trade tensions continued until Trump’s first term ends in 2021.
In the era of Trump’s leadership, Taiwan also faced American policies that could be described as strategic ambiguity in a more unfriendly posture. Strategic ambiguity itself can be understood as a policy that reflects uncertainty over whether Washington would go to war in the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan (Kuo, 2023). Therefore, this article contends that this strategy could be characterized as a more unfriendly move toward Taiwan, since even though Trump had a phone conversation with Tsai-ing Wen – the then-president of Taiwan – Trump reiterated that the United States remained committed to the principle of the One-China Policy (Scott, 2017). In addition, on the one hand, the first meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in April 2017 resulted in several positive agreements on bilateral trade issues and the North Korean nuclear project, which was expected to improve the relationship between the two major powers.
‘We have made tremendous progress in our relationship with China. We will be making additional progress. The relationship developed by President Xi and myself I think is outstanding. And I believe lots of very potentially bad problems will be going away’ Donald Trump’s statement after his first meeting with Xi Jinping (Holland & Qing, 2017).
However, on the other hand, the United States announced arms sales with Taiwan worth $1.42 billion, $330 million, and $550 million in 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively (John F, 2017; Reuters, 2019). To sum up, the United States’ gesture toward Taiwan then was very pragmatic – highly influenced by American interests toward China – similar to when the United States decided to shift diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China during Jimmy Carter’s presidency.
TRUMP’S SECOND VICTORY: HOW IT MIGHT SHAPE THE U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS
Donald Trump’s victory has been the subject of a mixed bag of commentary from international relations scholars on what effect the result of U.S. 2024 election will have on China and the Taiwan issue. Indeed, Trump’s isolationist tendency might impose a mixed negative and positive outcomes. For China, as it seeks greater influence in the international system, Donald Trump’s policy of disengaging from or reducing the U.S. contribution to some international cooperation, such as with Japan, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and NATO, might make it easier for China to carry out its expansive foreign policy without strong pressure from the United States. On the Taiwan question, China may also benefit from Donald Trump’s leadership. Although the US-Taiwan arms sales cooperation is most likely to continue, Trump seems to be more pragmatic when it comes to protecting Taiwan, since he mentioned that Taiwan ‘does not give the country [the United States] anything’ and that Taiwan should pay for the U.S. protection over the self-ruled island (Davidson, 2024).
Nevertheless, the Chinese government cannot afford to ignore the trade war, which is likely to intensify in the second term of Donald Trump’s presidency. It comes after Donald Trump pledged to increase duties on Chinese goods by 45 percent. Economic issues are also being considered by Donald Trump as a means of “pressure” on China not to invade Taiwan.
‘I would say, “if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you, at 150% to 200%”. I had a very strong relationship with him [Xi Jinping]. I wouldn’t have to [use military force], because he [Xi Jinping] respects me and he knows I’m f— crazy’ (Donald Trump statement during his interview with the Wall Street Journal) (Singh, 2024).
This economic approach is quite different from Biden’s commitment to the mobilization of the U.S. military in support of Taiwan’s resistance to a Chinese invasion (Brunnstorm & Hunnicutt, 2022).
Taiwan, similiar with China, is waiting to see how Trump’s policies will affect the relationship between the two governments and cross-strait relations. As mentioned above, Trump’s policy on the Taiwan issue is based on a pragmatic and transactional approach which means that the Taiwanese government will have to make more efforts to convince the Trump administration to remain ‘the Protector of Formosa’. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to consider the influence of Trump’s circle, which strongly supports America’s efforts to deter China’s influence, including arming Taiwan. Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, proposed the Taiwan Peace Through Strength Act in 2022 when he was a U.S. senator (Ruiz Casado, 2024). The Act promotes the militarization of Taiwan to counter China’s increasing military provocations, including the establishment of a comprehensive joint training program and the allocation of $2 billion per year in U.S. foreign military financing to support Taiwan (Rubio Senate, 2022) .
WHAT WE CAN EXPECT
Foreign policy tends to be the focus of attention for those interested in international relations following changes in presidential administrations, especially in the U.S. because of the country’s strong influence in the international system. The election of Donald Trump as the 47th president of the United States could be a game changer for the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, in light of his policies towards China and Taiwan. Donald Trump’s statements during his campaign suggest that his foreign policy approach toward China and Taiwan will not be much different from his first term, which was pragmatic and transactional. This approach leads us to expect that the United States will remain committed to the one-China policy during Trump’s second term. This approach, combined with the influence of individuals in his administration, could heighten U.S. strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan question. On the one hand, Donald Trump is unlikely to risk his relationship with Xi Jinping over Taiwan since the United States still needs China to negotiate with North Korean leaders (Lee, 2019). Moreover, the White House interest under a Republican administration to protect Taiwan is induced more by the urgency of maintaining the U.S. supremacy than by a moral-driven policy as a democracy that must assist other democracies. On the other hand, as just noted, it is important for the U.S. to contain China’s growing influence, thereby making China’s dream of reunifying Taiwan will not go unchallenged.
References
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Buchholz, K. (2019, August 19). The U.S.-China Trade Deficit is Growing. Statista. https://www.statista.com/chart/15419/the-us-trade-balance-with-china/
Davidson, H. (2024, July 17). Trump says Taiwan should pay the US for its defence as ‘it doesn’t give us anything.’The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/17/donald-trump-taiwan-pay-us-defence-china-national-convention
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Kuo, R. (2023, January 18). “Strategic Ambiguity” May Have U.S. and Taiwan Trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/01/strategic-ambiguity-may-have-us-and-taiwan-trapped.html
Lee, Y. N. (2019, February 28). Trump says China has been ‘a big help’ in US dealings with North Korea. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/trump-says-china-has-been-a-big-help-in-us-dealings-with-north-korea.html
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