With its October 7 vote in the 47-member United Nations Human Rights Council against holding China accountable for its treatment of ethnic Uyghurs in its restive Xinjiang province, the Indonesian government appears to have put its preference for Beijing’s cash over the needs of its fellow Muslims.
The council is the UN’s top human rights body. The 19-17 vote, with 11 members abstaining, drew an angry response from Uyghur and other human rights advocates, who accused governments in the voting majority of pandering to China.
Human Rights Watch’s Deputy Asia Director Phil Robertson accused Indonesia on SC News of having “shamelessly abandoned the Uyghurs” and voted ‘no’ on the resolution for political reasons. “They worried that crossing the Chinese government could result in major problems with Beijing at the upcoming G-20 Summit in Bali that President Widodo has placed such a priority on.” Mr. Robertson told SBS News.
The campaign to hold China responsible began in May at the hands of the US, the UK and other western nations, with the council calling on Beijing to be held responsible for what the council in its own report called massive human rights violations in so-called re-education camps, which have allegedly imprisoned more than a million Muslims. In addition, the report described mass detention, political indoctrination and forced assimilation into Han Chinese society. However, Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, joined 18 other nations in voting against holding China responsible.
Indonesia’s foreign minister, in an interview with Voice of America news, argued that the Human Rights Council shouldn’t be used for political purposes, “it is not selective in choosing the issues discussed,” he said.
That is a convenient argument that ignores some very real issues, the most troubling of which is whether Jakarta has sold out to Beijing, becoming increasingly reliant on China for aid and development. China is now Indonesia’s largest trading partner and investor. In 2021, the value of Indonesia’s exports to China reached US$63.63 billion, dominated by fossil fuels and nickel. The import value from China was US$60.71 billion, dominated by the raw or auxiliary materials needed to boost the productivity of domestic industry.
China is currently leading many major infrastructure projects including the US$8- billion Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway megaproject. Once completed, it will be the first high-speed rail link in Southeast Asia. As Asia Sentinel reported on September 26, China has also become far and away the biggest investor in Nusantara, President Joko Widodo’s plan to transfer Indonesia’s administrative capital 1,700 km out of Jakarta to East Kalimantan. A recent study by the Global Development Policy Center identified 14 project clusters including three industrial complexes funded by Chinese FDI which present risks to primary forest areas and health risks to nearby indigenous communities. In addition, Indonesia has increased its debt to China, reaching over US$411.5 million. And it has begun to increasingly use the Chinese yuan as a medium of exchange in its foreign transactions.
During the pandemic, China also became Indonesia’s largest supplier of vaccines although the government endured considerable criticism from the public over the fact that China’s vaccines were considered less effective than ones supplied by western nations. The government later switched to Moderna for health workers who had received two Sinovac doses.
Jakarta’s reluctance to antagonize Beijing has played out in the South China Sea, where the government has been aggressive in keeping other countries’ fishing vessels out of its rich fishing grounds but has been reluctant to respond to China’s aggressiveness. In recent years, the China Coast Guard and Chinese ships have often entered Indonesian waters north of the Natuna Islands, which lie well inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Yet the Indonesian Navy has preferred just to monitor the Chinese ships from less than one mile away rather than confronting them.
China’s Islamic Diplomacy This dependency has been supported by China’s growing use of what might be called Islamic diplomacy, which began in 2016 during the active implementation of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has four main components. First, China is framing its Xinjiang policy in the context of terrorism and separatism. In 2018, responding to protests against its Xinjiang policy, the then-Chinese Ambassador, Xiao Qian, visited the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s two largest Islamic organizations, to inform them of what he called “the real conditions in Xinjiang.” During the visit, he framed China’s repression against the Uyghurs as counter-separatism and counter-terrorism and presented Beijing as an ally of moderate Indonesian Muslims in the fight against a mutual foe.
China also invited the organizations to visit China including the troubled area. After Muhammadiyah nonetheless issued an open letter in February 2019 criticizing China’s Xinjiang policy, Jakarta kept mum on the issue. China invited top clerics of NU, Muhammadiyah, and the Council of Ulama Indonesia (MUI) on tours of the camps to witness conditions.
China has also offered donations and collaborated on specific projects, particularly NU’s charitable endeavors, with the embassy in 2015 donating funds to NU-run orphanages. In 2018, the embassy also funded the building of sanitation facilities in NU-dominated villages in West Java. Some 32 Muhammadiyah-run universities across Indonesia have collaborated with Chinese universities.
Lastly, Beijing has provided scholarships to members of NU and Muhammadiyah to pursue education in China. Some scholarship holders have been invited to Beijingorchestrated conferences and workshops on Xinjiang and on strengthening ChinaIndonesia relations.
These efforts have proven fruitful. Several NU figures, such as the chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf, have asked Indonesians not to criticize China on the Uyghur issue.
Nonetheless, Muhammadiyah continues to be openly critical, alleging that the 2019 visit of its representatives was choreographed, which has been confirmed by some Western media which reported the organizations’ representatives were not taken to the ‘real camps’ where the Uyghurs were being held and were made to believe that the so-called re-education camps were intended to provide job training and to combat extremism. Although Beijing has denied such claims, organizations such as Human Rights Watch have confirmed that the visit was orchestrated.
Yet, a recent peer-reviewed study reveals that there has been a shifting of views among Muhammadiyah members in their social media activities to show a more positive image of China, including its Xinjiang policy. As there are strong ties between Muslim organizations and the government, these organizations’ uncritical view can be one major reason behind Jakarta’s silence on the Xinjiang issue. The organizations hold some sway over the government, given the fact many of their members are in the cabinet. For example, NU’s Deputy Secretary-General, Masduki Baidlowi, has issued a statement arguing that Indonesia’s soft approach on the Xinjiang issue is the right way. He is also the spokesperson for the current Vice President Ma’ruf Amin.