Understanding ASEAN as Security Community
Echoing a phoenix emerging from the ashes, ASEAN was founded in 1967 in the midst of turmoil, conflict, and confrontation that continued to shake the Southeast Asian region. For centuries, the region had experienced colonial rule—beginning in the 16th century—and was later subjected to persistent instability fuelled by ideological rivalries during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Internal unrest, such as recurring rebellions in Indonesia to ethnic tensions in Myanmar, as well as unresolved border disputes further contributed to the fragile security environment in Southeast Asia.
The emergence of a regional organization fostered renewed aspirations for stability, peace, and enduring cooperation among its member states. These hopes were further solidified in 1976, when ASEAN’s founding countries—Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore—formally committed to shared principles by signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The treaty articulated core values such as non-interference, mutual respect, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, which have since shaped the normative framework of ASEAN cooperation (Yamakage, 2017). The treaty has since undergone three amendments, in line with the gradual expansion of ASEAN membership to include Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos, with Cambodia joining as the last member state in 1999.
ASEAN’s success in bringing together ten countries under a regional framework has led to its recognition as a security community. A security community is defined as a condition in which states and societies within a given region become increasingly integrated under shared institutions, while developing a collective identity that prioritizes peaceful mechanisms for resolving conflicts—particularly those that arise between member states (Acharya, 2009; Deutsch et al., 1957). At first glance, ASEAN appears to fulfil the characteristics of a security community, especially with the formal establishment of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) in 2015. The creation of the APSC marked a significant institutional step in ASEAN’s efforts to consolidate regional peace and security. It reaffirmed the organization’s commitment to a rule-based order and its vision of fostering ‘a cohesive, peaceful, stable, and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009; Khoirunnisa, 2023).
Acharya further observed that the principle of peaceful dispute settlement has been effectively implemented, as evidenced by the absence of armed conflict among its founding members since the inception of ASEAN and its active role in supporting peace efforts during the Cambodia–Vietnam conflict in 1991 (Acharya, 2009; Pou et al., 2021) Despite ASEAN’s normative commitment to peaceful dispute resolution, the resurgence of the Thailand–Cambodia border conflict on 24 July 2025 posed a significant test for the organization. The armed confrontation, which claimed the lives of more than 30 individuals—including both civilians and military personnel—has sparked concerns over the actual capacity of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) to implement preventive diplomacy effectively and to manage or de-escalate both intra- and inter-regional conflicts (Al Jazeera, 2025).
A Brief Overview of Thailand-Cambodia Dispute
The border conflict between Bangkok and Phnom Penh over the Preah Vihear Temple area has deep historical roots, dating back to the post-French colonial era in the Indochina region. The competing claims over the temple were brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled that the temple itself belonged to Cambodia. However, this decision ultimately created a ticking time bomb, as it failed to resolve the full scope of the territorial dispute. Although the Thai government formally accepted the ruling regarding Cambodian ownership of the temple, the surrounding 4.6 km2 area were left unaddressed, leaving room for future tensions to escalate (Wagener, 2011). The people living near the temple has repeatedly experienced episodes of armed confrontation between Thai and Cambodian forces, most notably in 2008 and 2011—events that once again prompted the involvement of both the ICJ and ASEAN. The most recent clash, which occurred in late July 2025, was characterized by the Cambodian government as an act of aggression by Thailand, signalling a renewed escalation in the longstanding territorial dispute (Planasari, 2025).
To summarize, the conflict has persisted for decades without a lasting resolution. Its recurrence has been driven not only by unresolved territorial issues but also by entrenched mistrust and negative perceptions between the governments and peoples of both countries. The 2008 and 2011 dispute, in particular, were exacerbated by the involvement of ultra-nationalist groups and anti-Thaksin demonstrators in Thailand, whose political agendas exacerbated bilateral hostility—particularly given that former Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, maintained notably close relations with his Cambodian counterpart during his reign (Pongsudhirak, 2018). Negative sentiment toward Cambodia also grew within Thai society, rooted in the historical memory of Siam’s defeat by French-backed Cambodia—a loss that has often been perceived as a national humiliation (Jenne, 2017). These circumstances have further deepened scepticism regarding ASEAN’s ability to function as a credible mediator capable of producing durable solutions—let alone cultivating a meaningful ‘sense of community’ among its populations to mitigate intra-regional tensions.
ASEAN in Action? Evaluating Regional Response to Thailand-Cambodia Crisis
ASEAN has consistently sought to contribute to preventing the escalation of conflict whenever tensions flared between Thailand and Cambodia. In 2011, for instance, Indonesia, as the ASEAN Chair at the time, encouraged both parties to agree to a ceasefire through shuttle diplomacy. In this approach, Jakarta, led by former Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, held separate negotiations with each of the conflicting parties (Fadhilah, 2022). Although a ceasefire agreement was successfully reached, the high level of mistrust between Thailand and Cambodia became a major obstacle to achieving a swift or even permanent ceasefire, as mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Wagener, 2011).
Amid the clash that took place in 2025, Malaysia, acting as the current ASEAN Chair, responded promptly to the crisis by offering to mediate between the two parties. Nevertheless, reports indicated that the willingness of both sides to enter negotiations was also influenced by pressure from the United States and China (Karuppannan, 2025). This suggests that, in this instance, ASEAN did not possess sufficient leverage to effectively urge its member states to uphold regional stability. Furthermore, the mediation efforts spearheaded by Malaysia raised questions about whether such an initiative could genuinely be considered a reflection of ASEAN’s collective role, especially in light of the limited responses from other ASEAN member states in the aftermath of the crisis. This lack of unified action cast doubt on the organization’s coherence and effectiveness in addressing intra-regional conflicts. In fact, the recurrence of armed clashes between Thailand and Cambodia reignited long-standing criticisms of the ASEAN Way and its foundational principle of non-interference — both of which are increasingly viewed as structural constraints that hinder ASEAN’s ability to go beyond facilitating temporary ceasefires and instead work toward achieving long-term peace and conflict resolution between its member states (Khang, 2025).
In retrospect, ASEAN’s mediation efforts resulted only in a temporary ceasefire agreement, without addressing the underlying causes of the conflict — particularly the unresolved border dispute and the lingering negative sentiments between Thailand and Cambodia stem from their colonial past. Notably, at the early stage of the conflict, Phnom Penh opted to appeal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for intervention rather than relying on ASEAN mechanisms. This decision highlighted not only the lack of confidence in ASEAN’s conflict resolution capacity but also the organization’s weak leadership in responding to regional crises (Khmer Times, 2025). Despite the repeated emphasis on ‘shared norms and values’ in the APSC Blueprint 2025, this conflict illustrates that the realization of a true ‘security community’—in which ASEAN governments and societies genuinely perceive themselves as part of a cohesive community—still appears to be a distant goal.
Referensi
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