Netanyahu returns to Power, What to Anticipate?
Israel has just held the parliamentary election of 2022. Far-right parties won a majority seat in the Knesset and ousted the incumbent centrist coalition led by Yair Lapid. This situation may result in the projection of the return of Benjamin Netanyahu to power. Palestinian citizens and government will face a hard time during the Netanyahu-led government. His gains are prompted by the rise of far-right Israeli voters. However, his win might be expected by Middle Eastern countries as a balance of power with Iran. While his cabinet will more likely receive criticism from the US. The legislative election of 2022 prevented the Likud Party (Netanyahu’s party) or Yesh Atid (Yair Lapid’s party) from gaining the majority seat of the Knesset or 61 seats. However, Likud merged with Religious Zionism, and Otzma Yehudit and two other ultra-orthodox parties gained 64 out of 120 seats in the Knesset. Otzma Yehudit’s leader, Itaman Ben-Gvir, is considered extreme far right for Israel’s far right. Once, he advocated for Arab Israelis (sometimes referred to as “Palestinians living in Israel”) to undergo a “Loyalty Test” to determine who is disloyal to their ancestral homeland. From here, Netanyahu’s return to power may complicate the relations between the Israeli government, Israeli Arabs, and the Palestinian Authorities. So, what may disadvantage Palestinians? As 4.5 million Palestinians living in the Palestinian Territories within the Occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, they are subject to Israeli Law and affected by the election. Since they are Palestinian citizens, they have no right to be represented in the Knesset, even in the law-making process for the region of Judea and Samaria. Back in 2020, Trump initiated the Trump Peace Plan or officially called “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People” which was announced by Trump and Netanyahu. This peace plan is criticized due to the zero involvement of any Palestinian representatives and the map of Israel with Palestinian enclaves. This map is more confusing than the current Palestinian authority boundaries within the Occupied West Bank. And today, Netanyahu pledged to legalize dozens of illegal settler outposts in the area, after meeting with Ben-Gvir. The rise of the extreme far right in Israel stimulates the victory of Likud and their allies and secures Netanyahu’s position to be the Israeli prime minister. Netanyahu has been cultivating his relations with the right extremist. And since 2021, Ben-Gvir and his party gained more support after frictions between Arabs and Jews who live In the same area within Israel proper after the hostilities in the Gaza area. This continued with various attacks from the Palestinians against Israeli settlers in the Occupied West Bank. The main campaign of the right-wing is the establishment of “law and order” in Israeli society. Many of the voters of the far-right parties are secular, upper middle class, young Israeli generations who are first-timer voters in the election. We can see the extremist, racist, and supremacist attitude when during the commemoration of 32 years of Rabbi Meir Kahane’s death Ben-Gvir was hooted by the sympathizers for his statement that he does not want to deport all Arabs. Meanwhile, the victory of Netanyahu and his allies is congratulated by the president of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan. The president is also inviting Netanyahu. Netanyahu stated after he received the invitation to UAE by saying “Sheikh bin Zayed invited me to visit his country so that we can advance our relations together. I thank him for the conversation and the excellent relationship between us”. This attitude shows the acceptance of Netanyahu by the Israeli Middle Eastern close friends as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also congratulated him. Erdogan and Netanyahu talked about the continuation of cooperation between Israel and Turkey to bring peace and stability to the Region. On the other hand, normalization of bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia might be an option for Netanyahu. These countries see more prospective cooperation in the region which Netanyahu will be seen to strengthen the balance of power between the Gulf Arab States and Iran. However, Benjamin Netanyahu will receive a reaction from Israel’s cross-Atlantic ally, the United States. Even though US President Joe Biden congratulates Netanyahu, Biden’s administration and Democratic Party might disagree or boycott far-right ministers that Netanyahu appoints in the future. Two of the major Jewish groups in the US, the Anti-Defamation League, and the American Jewish Committee, have voiced their concerns along with the Democratic Congressman Brad Sherman. Sherman stated that he urges Israeli political leaders to ostracize extremists like Itamar Ben-Gvir whose outrageous views run contrary to Israel’s core principles of a democratic and Jewish state. In conclusion, Israeli legislative election just resulted in the triumph of Benjamin Netanyahu with his far-right alliance defeating a more centrist Yair Lapid. The win is inseparable from the rise of far-right secular younger generations in Israel. This situation disadvantages Palestinian citizens and worries Arab citizens of Israel. At the same time, Gulf Arab leaders and Turkish leaders are more likely in favor of Netanyahu as Israeli Prime Minister to create a balance of power with Iran. But this may concern the US, particularly in the Democrat’s administration.
Indonesia Ducks Uyghur Issue in United Nations ‘Islamic diplomacy’, development dollars get in the way
With its October 7 vote in the 47-member United Nations Human Rights Council against holding China accountable for its treatment of ethnic Uyghurs in its restive Xinjiang province, the Indonesian government appears to have put its preference for Beijing’s cash over the needs of its fellow Muslims. The council is the UN’s top human rights body. The 19-17 vote, with 11 members abstaining, drew an angry response from Uyghur and other human rights advocates, who accused governments in the voting majority of pandering to China. Human Rights Watch’s Deputy Asia Director Phil Robertson accused Indonesia on SC News of having “shamelessly abandoned the Uyghurs” and voted ‘no’ on the resolution for political reasons. “They worried that crossing the Chinese government could result in major problems with Beijing at the upcoming G-20 Summit in Bali that President Widodo has placed such a priority on.” Mr. Robertson told SBS News. The campaign to hold China responsible began in May at the hands of the US, the UK and other western nations, with the council calling on Beijing to be held responsible for what the council in its own report called massive human rights violations in so-called re-education camps, which have allegedly imprisoned more than a million Muslims. In addition, the report described mass detention, political indoctrination and forced assimilation into Han Chinese society. However, Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, joined 18 other nations in voting against holding China responsible. Indonesia’s foreign minister, in an interview with Voice of America news, argued that the Human Rights Council shouldn’t be used for political purposes, “it is not selective in choosing the issues discussed,” he said. That is a convenient argument that ignores some very real issues, the most troubling of which is whether Jakarta has sold out to Beijing, becoming increasingly reliant on China for aid and development. China is now Indonesia’s largest trading partner and investor. In 2021, the value of Indonesia’s exports to China reached US$63.63 billion, dominated by fossil fuels and nickel. The import value from China was US$60.71 billion, dominated by the raw or auxiliary materials needed to boost the productivity of domestic industry. China is currently leading many major infrastructure projects including the US$8- billion Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway megaproject. Once completed, it will be the first high-speed rail link in Southeast Asia. As Asia Sentinel reported on September 26, China has also become far and away the biggest investor in Nusantara, President Joko Widodo’s plan to transfer Indonesia’s administrative capital 1,700 km out of Jakarta to East Kalimantan. A recent study by the Global Development Policy Center identified 14 project clusters including three industrial complexes funded by Chinese FDI which present risks to primary forest areas and health risks to nearby indigenous communities. In addition, Indonesia has increased its debt to China, reaching over US$411.5 million. And it has begun to increasingly use the Chinese yuan as a medium of exchange in its foreign transactions. During the pandemic, China also became Indonesia’s largest supplier of vaccines although the government endured considerable criticism from the public over the fact that China’s vaccines were considered less effective than ones supplied by western nations. The government later switched to Moderna for health workers who had received two Sinovac doses. Jakarta’s reluctance to antagonize Beijing has played out in the South China Sea, where the government has been aggressive in keeping other countries’ fishing vessels out of its rich fishing grounds but has been reluctant to respond to China’s aggressiveness. In recent years, the China Coast Guard and Chinese ships have often entered Indonesian waters north of the Natuna Islands, which lie well inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Yet the Indonesian Navy has preferred just to monitor the Chinese ships from less than one mile away rather than confronting them. China’s Islamic Diplomacy This dependency has been supported by China’s growing use of what might be called Islamic diplomacy, which began in 2016 during the active implementation of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has four main components. First, China is framing its Xinjiang policy in the context of terrorism and separatism. In 2018, responding to protests against its Xinjiang policy, the then-Chinese Ambassador, Xiao Qian, visited the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s two largest Islamic organizations, to inform them of what he called “the real conditions in Xinjiang.” During the visit, he framed China’s repression against the Uyghurs as counter-separatism and counter-terrorism and presented Beijing as an ally of moderate Indonesian Muslims in the fight against a mutual foe. China also invited the organizations to visit China including the troubled area. After Muhammadiyah nonetheless issued an open letter in February 2019 criticizing China’s Xinjiang policy, Jakarta kept mum on the issue. China invited top clerics of NU, Muhammadiyah, and the Council of Ulama Indonesia (MUI) on tours of the camps to witness conditions. China has also offered donations and collaborated on specific projects, particularly NU’s charitable endeavors, with the embassy in 2015 donating funds to NU-run orphanages. In 2018, the embassy also funded the building of sanitation facilities in NU-dominated villages in West Java. Some 32 Muhammadiyah-run universities across Indonesia have collaborated with Chinese universities. Lastly, Beijing has provided scholarships to members of NU and Muhammadiyah to pursue education in China. Some scholarship holders have been invited to Beijingorchestrated conferences and workshops on Xinjiang and on strengthening ChinaIndonesia relations. These efforts have proven fruitful. Several NU figures, such as the chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf, have asked Indonesians not to criticize China on the Uyghur issue. Nonetheless, Muhammadiyah continues to be openly critical, alleging that the 2019 visit of its representatives was choreographed, which has been confirmed by some Western media which reported the organizations’ representatives were not taken to the ‘real camps’ where the Uyghurs were being held and were made to believe that the so-called re-education camps were intended to provide job training and to combat extremism. Although Beijing has denied such claims, organizations such as Human Rights Watch have confirmed that the visit was orchestrated. Yet, a
Indonesia dan Perlombaan Perkembangan Industri Kendaraan Listrik di Asia Tenggara
Gabungan Industri Kendaraan Indonesia (Gaikindo) baru saja menyelesaikan perhelatan akbar Gaikindo Indonesia Internasional Auto Show (GIIAS) pada 11-21 Agustus 2022 lalu. Acara tersebut merupakan salah satu pameran produk otomotif terbesar di Indonesia atau bahkan di Asia Tenggara setelah Thailand, dan beberapa kali juga digunakan oleh berbagai prinsipal otomotif untuk peluncuran global kendaraan barunya. Hal menarik dalam perhelatan tahun ini adalah dengan semakin banyaknya kendaraan listrik yang dipajang di acara tersebut. Terdapat lebih dari 15 kendaraan listrik yang dipamerkan dan siap dipasarkan di Indonesia (Kurniawan, 2022). Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa tidak hanya tingginya minat pasar Indonesia terhadap kendaraan listrik, namun juga antusiasme industri otomotif untuk membawa teknologi baru tersebut ke pasar negara berkembang. Fenomena tersebut juga terlihat dari keseriusan pengembangan industri kendaraan listrik di dalam negeri. Dimulai dari pengembangan dan penjualan kendaraan motor listrik, baik oleh perusahaan start-up seperti Gesit hingga perusahaan motor yang lebih besar seperti Viar (Abdurachman, 2019) atau bahkan industri elektronik Polytron (Raherdian, 2021). Di sisi lain, investasi asing untuk pengembangan basis produksi kendaraan listrik juga terus bergulir. Tercatat Hyundai dan LG Energy Solution telah berinvestasi Rp. 15,9 triliun untuk pembangunan pabrik baterai kendaraan listrik di Indonesia (Daniel, 2021). Selain itu, Hyundai juga telah berinvestasi sebesar US$ 1,15 miliar guna pengembangan perakitan kendaraan, termasuk kendaraan listrik (Sinaga, 2021). Di sisi lain, Toyota juga tidak ketinggalan dengan komitmennya untuk berinvestasi hingga Rp. 27 triliun dalam pengembangan kendaraan listrik di Indonesia (Sandi, 2022). Selain Indonesia, di Asia Tenggara sendiri telah ada beberapa negara yang memiliki fokus dalam pengembangan industri serupa. Sebagai produsen otomotif terbesar di kawasan, Thailand juga terus berupaya menarik investasi untuk pengembangan teknologi kendaraan listrik dengan berbagai insentif yang ditawarkan pemerintah. Hal ini juga didukung dengan target peningkatan stasiun pengisian daya serta peningkatan kapasitas produksi kendaraan listrik yang mencapai 750.000 unit di 2030 (Bangkok Post, 2022). Malaysia sebagai produsen otomotif terbesar ketiga di kawasan juga telah mengumumkan keberhasilannya dalam menggandeng Volvo untuk membuka fasilitas perakitan kendaraan listrik di negara tersebut, sebagai pionir dalam produksi mobil listrik di industri otomotif domestiknya (MIDA, 2022). Apabila kita melihat dari sisi yang lebih luas, pengembangan industri kendaraan listrik merupakan fenomena yang terjadi di berbagai kawasan di dunia. Semakin meningkatnya kekhawatiran akan dampak polusi karbon dari alat transportasi dan diikuti dengan terus meningkatnya standar emisi yang ditetapkan oleh berbagai negara di dunia membuat peralihan teknologi yang lebih ramah lingkungan semakin tidak terelakkan, tak terkecuali di produk otomotif. Kendaraan listrik pun menjadi salah satu alternatif yang paling menarik mengingat penyediaan infrastruktur yang relatif lebih mudah dibangun dengan memanfaatkan infrastruktur dan sumber daya yang telah tersedia (mulai dari fasilitas perakitan kendaraan hingga penyediaan infrastruktur pengisian daya kendaraan). Dengan pergeseran tren tersebut, pengembangan teknologi industri otomotif untuk kendaraan listrik semakin tidak terelakkan untuk tetap dapat relevan dan bersaing dalam pasar otomotif domestik, regional, maupun global. Bagi pemerintah Indonesia, pengembangan teknologi dan industri kendaraan listrik merupakan suatu hal mutlak yang tidak dapat dilewatkan. Sebagai produsen otomotif terbesar kedua di kawasan, Indonesia memiliki potensi yang sangat besar untuk mendorong pengembangan basis produksi kendaraan listrik terbesar di Asia Tenggara. Hal ini dimulai dengan hal pertama, yaitu besarnya pasar domestik yang dimiliki oleh Indonesia. Dengan kemampuan penyerapan pasar terhadap produk mobil yang berkisar 1 juta unit tiap tahunnya, tentu ini merupakan potensi yang sangat besar. Hal ini belum termasuk dengan rasio kepemilikan kendaraan yang masih rendah, yaitu berkisar 99:1000, yang menunjukkan potensi pasar yang sangat besar untuk dikembangkan. Kedua, keberadaan industri otomotif yang telah lama beroperasi dan berkembang di Indonesia memberikan fondasi kuat, mengingat Indonesia tidak perlu mengembangkan industri ini dari awal. Industri hanya perlu mendapat dorongan untuk adanya transfer teknologi produksi teknologi baru serta pengembangan supplier komponen yang dibutuhkan untuk produksi kendaraan listrik. Ketiga, Indonesia merupakan salah satu produsen nikel terbesar di dunia, yang mana merupakan salah satu bahan utama dalam produksi baterai kendaraan listrik. Pemerintah bahkan telah mengesahkan peraturan pembatasan ekspor bijih nikel demi menekan produsen otomotif untuk berinvestasi baterai kendaraan listrik di Indonesia, yang mana merupakan komponen termahal dalam mobil listrik. Meski begitu, Indonesia tidak boleh lengah terhadap persaingan yang lebih ketat dari negara-negara tetangga. Terdapat beberapa tantangan yang perlu mendapatkan perhatian khusus dari pemerintah. Yang pertama adalah terkait dengan daya beli masyarakat Indonesia terhadap kendaraan listrik yang belum begitu besar. Harga yang terpaut jauh dengan harga rata-rata mobil yang terjual membuat banyak yang masih belum bisa menjangkaunya. Tercatat hingga saat ini jumlah mobil listrik masih kurang dari 1% dari total mobil yang terjual di Indonesia. Mengingat industri otomotif domestik yang masih sangat bergantung dengan pasar nasional, perlu ada insentif pembelian, penyediaan infrastruktur pengisian daya, dan dorongan lainnya guna meningkatkan penyerapan mobil listrik di pasar domestik. Kedua, masih didominasinya komponen impor dalam mobil listrik. Yang dapat diproduksi di dalam negeri, hanya berkisar 40% dari total komponen (Kemenperin RI, 2022). Masih jauh, dibandingkan dengan mobil berbahan bakar minyak yang mampu mencapai hingga lebih dari 80% komponennya. Oleh sebab itu, perlu ada upaya percepatan peningkatan persentase komponen lokal dengan mendorong pengembangan supplier komponen maupun investasi asing di berbagai sektor pendukung lainnya guna memastikan dominasi Indonesia pada sektor industri ini di kawasan. Ketiga, dengan perlombaan industri baterai untuk menciptakan solid-state battery, teknologi baterai yang tidak memiliki kandungan kobalt dan nikel (Chant, 2022), Indonesia juga perlu menyiapkan strategi pengembangan industri mobil listrik nasional yang berbasis pada pembatasan ekspor bijih nikel, dan mulai mendorong pengembangan teknologi industri baru tersebut begitu teknologi tersedia untuk diakses, maupun dengan pengembangan teknologi komponen mobil listrik lainnya yang belum dimiliki Indonesia. Keempat, Indonesia juga perlu untuk memastikan industri mobil listrik domestiknya tetap dapat bersaing secara kompetitif dengan industri serupa di negara-negara tetangga. Thailand dan Malaysia tercatat telah memberlakukan kebijakan-kebijakan yang memberikan insentif tidak hanya bagi industri mobil listrik, namun juga pada konsumen domestiknya dengan pemberian insentif pembelian kendaraan listrik serta proyek pengembangan infrastruktur pengisian kendaraan listrik. Bahkan Vinfast, perusahaan otomotif asal Vietnam, menjalankan strategi yang berbeda dengan menyasar langsung pasar mobil listrik Amerika Serikat dan Eropa (Honishi, 2022), tanpa bergantung pada pasar domestik atau regional, untuk memastikan penguatan reputasi dan kepastian pasar bagi produknya yang memiliki harga relatif lebih tinggi dibandingkan mobil konvensional yang mendominasi pasar Asia Tenggara. Indonesia memiliki potensi besar dalam
Normalisasi Arab – Israel Bukan Untuk Palestina
The Deal of Century yang menjadi simbol normalisasi Arab – Israel sejak tahun 2020 lalu menjadi salah satu cerita penting perjalanan isu hubungan Arab – Israel, dan penjajahan Israel terhadap Palestina yang telah terjadi hampir satu abad lamanya. Normalisasi ini diharapkan bukan hanya dapat menjalin hubungan positif, kerjasama di berbagai bidang dan level antara Arab dan Israel, tapi juga akan membuat negara – negara Arab dapat lebih mudah membujuk Israel agar menahan berbagai kekerasan terhadap kesewenang – wenanganya terhadap masyarakat Palestina. Logikanya sederhana, berteman baik akan lebih legitimate dan mudah menyelesaikan masalah daripada bermusuhan. Tapi, publik akan mengamati apakah memang narasi yang dibangun untuk menjustifikasi normalisasi ini akan betul terjadi, ataukah hanya sekedar pemanis belaka untuk menutupi kepentingan – kepentingan ekonomi, politik, dan keamanan negara – negara Arab. Di lihat dari proses, aktor dan kepentingan yang melingkupi normalisasi ini, kuat dugaan bahwa narasi optimistik terhadap masa depan Palestina tidak akan terwujud atau hanya isapan jempol belaka. Pertama, Dari perjanjian damai yang melibatkan Bahrain, Uni Emirat Arab tersebut, tidak ada klausul yang mengangkat isu tentang masa depan Palestina. Mungkin ada yang berpendapat, klausul itu hanya formalitas saja, sebab saat hubungan interdependensi telah terjadi, negara Arab akan menjadikan hubungan itu sebagai alat untuk menekan Israel. Tapi kita tidak boleh lupa, bahwa selama ini, Israel pun hidup matinya sangat bergantung pada negara – negara Muslim di sekitarnya: ruang udara, darat, laut untuk melakukan ekspor impor barang. Termasuk kebutuhan dasar sehari – hari mereka pun bergantung pada negara – negara lain seperti air minum, minyak, gas, kacang – kacangan, atau bahan – bahan makanan yang lain (United States Department of Agriculture, 2022), termasuk dalam aspek keamanan regional. Terbukti, hubungan intensif Mesir, Yordania dan Turki dengan Israel selama puluhan tahun tidak mampu berkontribusi positif terhadap kondisi Palestina yang terus tergusur, didiskriminasi, dan diperlakukan secara tidak manusiawi. Bahkan, meskipun, Israel secara geostrategis adalah negara yang rentan (lacks of strategic depth), nyatanya tidak ada yang mampu melawan dan mengambil sikap tegas terhadap Israel (Khan, 2020). Alasannya adalah sejak dibentuk oleh Inggris dan dideklarasikan oleh PBB tahun 1948, negara – negara maju telah habis – habisan mem back – up Israel. Negara ini ibaratnya menjadi anak emas AS saat ini dengan bantuan militer dan finansial terbesar setiap tahunnya (Sharp, 2022). Bukan hanya itu, hegemoni AS di Tim-Teng melalui kebijakan Israel first menyediakan keamanan penuh bagi Israel. Jika ada rezim yang terlihat mengancam, akan dilengserkan segera. Contohnya, kudeta Dr. Mohammad Mursi tahun 2013 oleh militer Mesir antek AS. Kedua, Normalisasi Arab – Israel memang bukanlah untuk tujuan perdamaian Israel – Palestina, tapi murni kepentingan pragmatis negara – negara Arab. Mereka terancam oleh Iran; terancam oleh gerakan oposisi dan gerakan politik Islam yang menguat di Arab sejak era musim semi Arab; ditambah lagi tergiur oleh insentif – insentif yang dijanjikan oleh AS dalam normalisasi ini. Insentif – insentif ini telah didapatkan juga oleh Mesir dan Yordania saat bersedia menjalin hubungan baik dengan Israel (Muasher, 2021). Jadi, Yang diuntungkan dari normalisasi ini sebenarnya bukan Arab, bukan pula Palestina tapi, kepentingan Israel dan AS. Dengan Kerjasama intensif Israel – Arab akan semakin memperkuat posisi Israel di Timur Tengah melalui berbagai Kerjasama ekonomi yang terjadi baik di level pemerintahan maupun bisnis (Middle East Monitor, 2022). Bahkan perusahaan – perusahaan Israel yang ikut dalam proyek penggusuran di Tepi barat juga sudah menjalin kerjasama dengan perusahaan – perusahaan Arab. Bukan hanya itu, Arab akan memberikan keamanan ekstra pada Israel dengan Kerjasama militer, keamanan, intelijen untuk membungkam gerakan – gerakan oposisi baik nasionalis maupun Islam. Israel juga akan semakin bebas melancong ke berbagai negara Arab untuk melakukan diplomasi budaya agar Israel terlihat baik, humanis dan berperadaban. Ini berpotensi semakin mengucikan Palestina dan para pejuang Palestina. Bahkan akan membuat mereka terlihat buruk dan akan dianggap kelompok – kelompok pengacau, ekstrimis, radikal dan teroris. Saat itu terjadi, AS akan merasa tenang, sebab potensi – potensi rival di Timur Tengah bisa dikendalikan baik di internal maupun dari eksternal seperti Iran, Rusia, China, dan oposisi Islam (Henkel & Asseburg, 2021). Sebab, negara – negara penting di kawasan sudah dikontrol melalui beragam pendekatan: kontraterorisme, bantuan keuangan dan militer, Kerjasama komprehensif; dan Normalisasi Israel. Normalisasi dan stabilitas Timur Tengah bagi AS sangat penting untuk fokus menghadapi ancaman di front lain, seperti menghadapi ancaman Rusia di Eropa dan Ancaman China di wilayah Asia – Pasifik. Tiga front ini bagi AS sangat penting, dan saling berhubungan untuk mempertahankan hegemoni AS di seluruh dunia. Jadi, ke depan publik akan menyaksikan sendiri normalisasi Arab bukan untuk perdamaian Palestina, dan bukan untuk kebaikan masyarakat Muslim Timur Tengah. Bukan juga untuk menciptakan dunia bebas dari penjajahan dan ketidakadilan. Ini politik dominasi dan hegemoni yang dikukuhkan oleh AS bersama sekutu melalui tangan – tangannya di Timur Tengah. Daftar Pustaka: Henkel, S. C., & Asseburg, M. (2021). Normalisation and Realignment in the Middle East: a new, conflict-prone regional order takes shape. Stiftung Wissenschaft Unf Politik (SWP). Khan, A. (2020). Israel’s Strategic Dilemmas. Geopolity. https://thegeopolity.com/2020/10/07/israels-strategic-dilemmas/ Middle East Monitor. (2022). Israel’s trade with Arab nations reaches record increases after normalisation. Middle East Monitor. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220704-israels-trade-with-arab-nations-reaches-record-increases-after-normalisation/ Muasher, M. (2021). Normalization of Arab Countries with Israel : Regional Geopolitical Aspects of the Agreements. IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, 58–61. https://www.iemed.org/publication/normalization-of-arab-countries-with-israel-regional-geopolitical-aspects-of-the-agreements/ Sharp, J. M. (2022). U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Version 42. In Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf United States Department of Agriculture. (2022). This Report Contains Assessments of Commodity and Trade Issues Made By Usda Staff And Not Necessarily Statements of Official U.S. Government Policy. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Israeli Food Supply Chain_Tel Aviv_Israel_IS2022-0004.pdf
Academic Capitalism and The Political Economy of World University Rankings: Lessons from Indonesia
Indonesia’s emerging economy has enabled its middle class to enjoy wider access for higher education services. In 2022, the country has 4,555 higher education institutions, with more than 75% of them are private universities (Kemdikbukristek 2022). These institutions are serving more than 9 million students at large. This number is expected to grow in the coming years, resulting from the increase of Indonesia’s middle class in 2030. On one hand, this trend reflects the future potential of Indonesia’s innovation. Many argue that the university plays a pivotal role in boosting up the state competitiveness. Taylor (2016) for example, highlighted how higher education has succeeded in empowering the innovation of developed countries through research and development. This may also explains why developing countries and the wider third world also pave their way for innovation through supporting universities. However, on the other hand, this trend should also be treated with caution. While universities are perceived as key players in enhancing the country’s development, they are also hardly able to survive from the grim fate of academic capitalism. Some universities have been reshaped as corporations style actors, producing services with degree provisions as their main commodities. In some developed countries, like Australia and the United Kingdom, for instance, higher education contributes significant roles in trade balance, boosting up trade in services. What is academic capitalism? How hard has academic capitalism reshaped the higher education institutions – and what went wrong? How has developing country, like Indonesia, been impacted by this trend? Contending academic capitalism As the economic milestone of globalization unfolds, the disruption of commercialization and marketization have prompted mass social changes (Rennen and Martens 2003). These include changes of paradigm in understanding the role of universities. In the past, during post-industrial and information society, the universities were perceived as main actors who nurtured community of knowledge (Arimoto 2011). Exchange of knowledge was much driven by the novelty and the passion of developing sciences. As the world has shifted into post-capitalist society since the 1960s, the role of universites has been dragged into the trap of marketization. The universities have turned into enterprise of knowledge by deliberately nurturing strong connection between research and commercialization. The way to measure the quality of academic staff has also been changed from teaching or research focused performance, shifted to a more universal and commercial criteria of academic professionalism. More interestingly, this structural transformation has also changed the approach of academic reward system, moving from attribution to achievement (Arimoto 2011). In a more broadly level, this academic capitalism has also raised the leverage of the university rankings from the national level in the US to the world level rankings. The political economy of world university rankings Amid the significant structural changes driven by academic capitalism, the debate of world university rankings has been one of the most contentious issues. Some argue that these instruments are on the right track, aspired by the ambitious quality assurance and the rationales of public accountability (Hazelkorn 2016). However, given the disparities of the world higher education institutions, others argue that these rankings are deemed to generate greater disbenefits than actual benefits. Regardless of the variety of methodologies and criteria, these world university rankings in practice are often seen as one size fits all instrument, and more likely to be “Harvardometers” (Goglio 2016). They measure how much the institution complies to the Anglo-Saxon-style elite research college model, where Harvard University in the US is perceived as the main model (Stack 2021). From the political economy perspective, the world university rankings have been an unequivocal demonstration of the repulsive effects of neoliberalism, with particular emphasis on the marketization of higher education (Rosser 2022). Where most of prominent rankers are commercial, study has revelead that universities may improved their position in the rankings should they subscribe the rankers’ products such as consulting, analytics, and the wider services, despite their institutional quality (O’Malley 2021). This situation highlights the fact that the academic capitalism has appeared to be firmly rooted in the current situation of higher education process. What happens in Indonesia As the universities are deemed to be enterprise of knowledge, the influence of academic capitalism is now at its best. In the post-capitalist society, the Indonesian 4,555 higher education institutions were engulfed by the neoliberalism agenda. It is crystal clear that the Indonesian government shares ambitious target in raising the positions of Indonesian top universities in the world rankings. Grant provisions were even intensively promoted to boost up the ranking’s position. Clusterisation of universities was once also introduced by the government to identify the institutional capacities (Wahid, Fathana, and Raharjo 2020). This government’s approach in understanding ranking is, unfortunately, seen as a role model by many higher education institutions in Indonesia. More recently, many Indonesian universities are involved in the ranking’s warfare. Some believe that rankings performance has correlation with the animo of new students’ intake. Some others are even trapped in the racing-to-the-bottom, where the ranking performance is merely used as marketing instruments. As results, non-academic rankings such as Webometrics and UniRank are popular in Indonesia, regardless of some questions on their methodology. What happens in Indonesia reflects a serious impact of academic capitalism. There should be deliberate actions to educate the society and the wider nations to restore the role of universities as community of learning and knowledge. In such, higher education should be also returned to be an agent for social advocacy, where the commercialization of knowledge should be placed after the public interests. Under such conditions, the current fallacy on world university rankings shall not prevail. — References Arimoto, A. 2011. “Reaction to Academic Ranking: Knowledge Production, Faculty Productivity from an International Perspective.” In University Rankings, The Changing Academy – The Changing Academic Profession in International Comparative Perspective, ed. Jung Cheol Shin. Springer Science & Business Media. Goglio, Valentina. 2016. “One Size Fits All? A Different Perspective on University Rankings.” Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 38(2): 212–26. Hazelkorn, Ellen. 2016. Global Rankings and the Geopolitics of Higher Education: Understanding the Influence and Impact of Rankings on Higher Education, Policy and Society. Taylor & Francis. Kemdikbukristek.
2022 Philippines Election: A View from Indonesia
When the first words of this article are being written, the preliminary results of the Philippines’ election have already been released by COMELEC, the official election commission of the Philippines. At the first sight, the writer himself could not believe that a son of a once-toppled kleptocratic-tyrannical dictator and his cliques are making a comfortable comeback as ruler in the Philippines. Initially, the writer tried to think that change is still possible in one of the oldest and most vibrant democracies in Asia. After all, most Philippines citizens would’ve probably learned lessons from the long periods of martial law under Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the father of the ‘victorious’ presidential candidate (BBC, 2022). Also, the years of hopelessness filled with political violence and human rights abuses during Rodrigo Duterte’s ruling had prompted some concerned Filipinos to mobilize a movement to initiate a new model of governance in the Philippines (Human Rights Watch, 2017). But the moment the writer continued his writing, two dynasties of human rights abusers who joined their hands as Presidential-Vice Presidential candidates gained significant support from the voters. As one of the Indonesian academics who have colleagues from the Philippines and followed the campaign trails of Philippine elections closely these months, the writer can’t help but make a parallel between the cases of the Philippines and Indonesia. While the Philippines is facing a possible kleptocratic dictatorship once again, Indonesia is also still trying to struggle to deal with the legacies of the Orde Baru regime and the tendencies of rising corruptive behaviors and political authoritarianism under Jokowi. After all these years of democratization and political reformation, what went wrong with Indonesia and the Philippines? A Systemic Problem: What Went Wrong? Despite the better options available for the Filipinos that were shown through the candidacy of Leni Robredo and Kiko Pangilinan as aspiring President and Vice President respectively, some Filipinos fell for the candidates who were never even attended the election debates. This brings us to the question: can we essentialize this phenomenon only to the context of developing democracies, such as the Philippines? In order to answer this question, Nicole Curato said that this phenomenon should not be exoticized only in the context of developing democracies (Curato, 2022). The rise of ‘populist’ and ‘strongman’ leaders like Victor Orban and Donald Trump is the real proof that this phenomenon is also happening in advanced democracies. On a regional level, the symptoms of an ill democracy that resulted in the popularity of ‘strongman’ could be seen in the cases of both Indonesia and the Philippines. Andres Ufen has even warned of a “Philippinization” of Indonesian politics since 2006. In short, Ufen tried to establish an argument that the Indonesian parties may take the shapes similar to the political machineries in the Philippines which not only lacked an ideological basis but were also prone to transactional politics and only used as a mere tool for political elites to secure their positions (Ufen, 2006). Despite the brief period of ideologization which was marked by the wave of ‘Islamic populism’ during the 2019 election, it could be seen that political parties are experiencing signs of de-ideologization (termed by Ufen as de-aliranization, similar to de-ideologization) and Indonesian political parties are increasingly influenced by strong presidentialism and party cartelization during the Jokowi era (Ufen, 2008; Slater, 2018). In the opinion of the writer, there are several reasons which have made the quality of democracy are becoming worse, especially after the 2019 election in Indonesia and the Philippines. The first point that needs to be highlighted here is the issue of disinformation that has challenged the essence of healthy democracy in both countries. During the course of the 2014 and 2019 general elections, Indonesian voters were being presented with malicious information presented by cyber troops (also known by the name of buzzer) that were recruited by campaign teams. These cyber troops are responsible for making a deep-rooted division between kecebong (pro-Jokowi supporters – kecebong means tadpole) and kadrun/kampret (pro-Prabowo supporters – kadrun means desert lizards and kampret means bat) happening until today (The Jakarta Post, 2019). The narratives that seek to establish the importance of choosing strong leader are also apparent in the case of Prabowo, who is associating himself with the ‘successful legacies’ and ‘stability’ of New Order (Vann, 2021). The writer is therefore not surprised to see the same case is also happening in the Philippines. Bongbong Marcos and his campaign team has manipulated public opinion by framing Marcos Sr’s legacy in an exaggerated way (The New York Times, 2022). Sadly, many younger generations in Indonesia and the Philippines who lacked literacy and enough historical knowledge easily consumed this kind of propaganda without further criticism. The second point that needs to be marked here is the strong case of political elitism in both countries, which shunned the possibility of oppositional voices being heard. While Jokowi’s victory in 2019 has seen by some as “victory of a lesser evil”, the increasing authoritarianism under Jokowi has made the quality of Indonesian democracy plunge significantly. Jokowi has always used his extensive presidential powers in order to curb many oppositional voices coming from all ideological strands, ranging from Islamist Hizbut-Tahrir to the activists of Papuan rights. Similar cases are also happening in the Philippines, where Duterte has increasingly put pressure towards journalists, environmental activists, and especially leftists. The third point is the rampant phenomenon of money politics. This is especially a significant marker for countries which implemented crony capitalism for decades. The practice of money politics in both countries is being empowered by the clientelist networks of elite politicians who are collaborating with oligarchs. In the case of Indonesia, it is known that aspiring candidates and their success teams are spreading in-cash donations during the early hours of election day (thus known as serangan fajar or dawn attack in English). This practice could also be witnessed during the days and weeks before the Philippines’ general election this year. Atienza saw this phenomenon as solidifying the ground
Mengapa Greenwashing Berbahaya dan Bagaimana Membebaskan Diri dari Perangkapnya?
Istilah greenwashing pertama diungkapkan oleh Jay Westerveld pada tahun 1986. Greenwashing merujuk pada kegiatan yang dilakukan oleh sekelompok orang dalam organisasi yang menghabiskan lebih banyak waktu dan uang untuk iklan dengan tujuan menjelaskan bahwa kinerja organisasi tersebut telah ‘hijau’ dan mempraktikkan kegiatan yang ramah lingkungan (Idowu et al., 2013). Sedangkan menurut Delmas & Burbano (2011) greenwashing dideskripsikan sebagai performa lingkungan sebuah perusahaan yang buruk dan komunikasi yang positif dalam menggambarkan performa tersebut. Perusahaan bukan berarti telah sepenuhnya menjalankan perekonomian maupun pembangunan hijau. Justru, tindakan menyesatkan mereka adalah mengelabui konsumen dengan mengatakan mereka telah melakukan proses produksi dengan cara hijau, tetapi sesungguhnya tidak. Berdasarkan penelitian di Amerika Serikat, hampir 4000 produk yang dikonsumsi masyarakat ditemukan unsur greenwashing di dalamnya (Orange, 2010). Beberapa contoh menyesatkan tentang produk yang diklaim ramah lingkungan antara lain penyebutan nontoxic (tidak beracun), natural (alami), dan fragrance free (bebas pewangi). Padahal pemerintah federal Amerika Serikat tidak pernah menetapkan standar lingkungan secara spesifik terhadap produk-produk tertentu (Orange, 2010). Tujuh Dosa Greenwashing Secara umum dikenal tujuh dosa greenwashing (UL, n.d.) atau juga disebut sebagai Claim Greenwashing (de Freitas Netto et al., 2020). Pertama, the sin of the hidden trade-off yang merupakan klaim yang menyatakan bahwa produk bersifat hijau secara sempit tanpa memerhatikan pada aspek lingkungan lain yang penting. Contohnya adalah pembuatan kain dari kapas, bukan berarti telah ramah lingkungan meskipun bahan baku kain diambil dari panen kapes di lahan sendiri. Masih ada aspek lain seperti kemungkinan lahan kapas merupakan hasil deforestasi, adanya eksploitasi buruh, pencemaran lingkungan dari pewarna tekstil, dan sebagainya. Kedua, the sin of no proof yang artinya adalah tidak ada bukti atau standar tertentu bahwa sebuah produk telah terverifikasi hijau. Contohnya adalah klaim mengenai kantong plastik yang berasal dari plastik daur ulang. Jika tidak ada detail informasi mengenai seberapa banyak komposisi plastik daur ulang dan detail yang lain, maka bisa dikatakan klaim hijau tidak dapat dibuktikan. Ketiga, the sin of vagueness merupakan klaim yang menyesatkan mengenai definisi yang kurang jelas atau terlalu luas, seperti ‘terbuat dari bahan alami’. Padahal, uranium, merkuri, dan arsenik (dan masih banyak contoh lain) merupakan bahan yang terbentuk secara alami tetapi beracun. Keempat, the sin of worshiping false label, yaitu sebuah produk yang seolah-olah memiliki mendapatkan sertifikasi, sehingga menyesatkan konsumen untuk memiliki pikiran bahwa produk tersebut telah memiliki sertifikasi hijau. Contohnya adalah produk yang memiliki tampilan berwarna hijau dan terdapat tulisan seperti ‘ramah lingkungan’, tanpa ada penjelasan atau sertifikasi tertentu yang dapat menjustifikasinya. Kelima, the sin of irrelevance merupakan klaim yang mungkin benar tetapi tidak penting atau memberikan dampak signifikan terhadap lingkungan, seperti pemberian label ‘bebas CFC’. Kenyataannya CFC telah dilarang untuk digunakan di banyak negara. Dengan memberi label tersebut, tidak akan menambah utilitas maupun kualitas produk. Keenam, the sin of lesser of two evils, yaitu klaim yang mungkin benar dalam kategori sebuah produk, tetapi bisa membahayakan karena dampak lingkungan yang lebih besar. Contohnya adalah produk mobil sport ramah lingkungan karena menggunakan bahan bakar dari listrik. Namun, sejatinya tetap menrusak lingkungan karena listrik diproduksi dari pembangkit listrik tenaga uap batu bara. Ketujuh, the sin of fibbing artinya adalah klaim hijau yang keliru. Contoh yang paling sering muncul adalah sertifikasi Energy Star yang mengklaim bahwa produk tersebut merupakan produk yang hemat energi dan ramah lingkungan. Namun, sebenarnya sertifikasi tersebut tidak ada. Alih-Alih ‘Hijau’, Greenwashing Justru Berbahaya Secara kultural, greenwashing dapat dikorelasikan dengan konsep antroposentrisme (Miller & Maxwell, 2017). Antroposentrisme menempatkan manusia sebagai pusat kegiatan pembangunan (Baker, 2006). Jika menggunakan logika tersebut, maka lazim jika perusahaan mengesampingkan aspek lingkungan dalam proses bisnis. Kini, perusahaan sudah banyak meninggalkan Claim Greenwashing. Akan tetapi, greenwashing tersebut justru ditransformasikan perusahaan dalam bentuk lain, yaitu Executional Greenwashing (de Freitas Netto et al., 2020). Contohnya adalah dengan menampilkan produk dengan nuansa warna-warna alam seperti hijau, cokelat, dan sebagainya, menggunakan logo-logo yang menggambarkan alam seperti hutan, laut, dan sebagainya, ataupun gambar hewan-hewan yang terancam punah seperti panda dan lumba-lumba. Greenwashing semakin berbahaya jika dihadapkan pada konteks corporate social responsibility (CSR). Perusahaan berupaya mengelabui konsumen dengan memberikan CSR, baik yang bernuansa ‘hijau’ atau tidak, untuk menutupi fakta bahwa perusahaan mereka tidak memenuhi standar lingkungan (Wu et al., 2020). Organisasi nonpemerintah internasional Greepeace telah berkali-kali menekan perusahaan-perusahaan multinasional untuk menetapkan standar dalam memerangi greenwashing dan pendanaan yang selaras dengan Kesepakatan Paris (Greenpeace International, 2021). Berdasarkan penelitian di 45 negara pada tahun 2004-2007, perusahaan yang lebih merusak lingkungan, terutama di negara-negara yang lebih terpapar pengawasan dan norma-norma global, cenderung tidak terlibat dalam pengungkapan selektif atau transparansi proses bisnis (Marquis, 2016). Padahal, transparansi seharusnya dilakukan oleh perusahaan dengan menjelaskan seberapa hijau praktik bisnisnya untuk mencegah kerusakan lingkungan yang lebih parah. Membebaskan Diri dari Perangkap Greenwashing Pertama, perlu memahami dan mengakui bahwa greenwashing merupakan sesuatu yang kita konsumsi sehari-hari, bahkan kita mungkin pernah terjebak dalam perangkapnya. Dengan memiliki kesadaran ini, maka kita akan cenderung lebih berhati-hati dan kritis dalam menilai produk hijau. Kedua, memulai gaya hidup dengan melakukan reuse, recycle, reduce produk-produk yang kita konsumsi. Menerapkan gaya hidup ini berarti kita telah memperpanjang usia produk yang kita konsumsi atau pakai, sehingga mengurangi kecenderungan untuk menjadi konsumtif. Ketiga, mempromosikan dan mengampanyekan bahaya greenwashing. Clicktivism menjadi jalan yang sering ditempuh untuk melakukan kampanye lingkungan. Keempat, kampanye saja tidak cukup, perlu dukungan secara sistemik dari otoritas untuk melepaskan konsumen dari jerat greenwashing. Otoritas perlu berkolaborasi dengan cendekiawan untuk merumuskan regulasi yang aplikatif dan tegas dalam menindak perusahaan yang melakukan greenwashing. Kelima, menuntut perusahaan untuk melakukan transparansi dalam bisnis yang ia jalankan. Dengan dukungan regulasi yang tepat, maka transparansi tidak sekadar hitam di atas putih, tetapi juga implementatif. Inti dari upaya ini adalah individu mungkin mampu menciptakan dampak di level mikro dalam melepaskan diri dari jerat greenwashing. Akan tetapi, di level hulu, pembuatan kebijakan yang aplikatif dan implementasi yang tegas merupakan aksi kolektif yang sesungguhnya. Tanpa kebijakan dari otoritas, maka upaya memberantas greenwashing terdengar seperti ‘menggarami air laut’. Referensi: Baker, S. (2006). Sustainable Development. New York: Routledge. de Freitas Netto, S. V., Sobral, M. F. F., Ribeiro, A. R. B., & Soares, G. R. da L. (2020). Concepts and forms of greenwashing: A systematic review. Environmental Sciences Europe, 32(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12302-020-0300-3